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I N S T I T U T E F O R E C O N O M I C A N A L Y S I S (C S I C)
 Abstract
I study the allocation of licenses to operate an
oligopolistic market characterized by high demand
uncertainty. The model is motivated by recent
experiences of spectrum licensing for new
telecommunication technologies. Demand is
uncertain at the time of investment (roll-out).  Firms
rely on credit both to invest and to acquire the
license. Under symmetry, and as a consequence of
the possibility of default, firms' investment is
decreasing in the debt inherited from the license
assignment stage. We compare auctions and beauty
contests. Auctions extract a higher license price, and
then lower investment. From a planner's point of
view,  beauty contests dominate auctions when the
revenue motive is unimportant and influence activities
are not too wasteful.
 Key words
Auctions, licenses, beauty contests, limited liability.
 Resumen
En este artículo estudio la asignación de licencias
para operar un mercado oligopolístico caracterizado
por alta incertidumbre de demanda. El modelo es
motivado por las experiencias recientes en asigna-
ción de licencias para uso de espectro radioeléctrico
para su uso por las nuevas tecnologías de telecomu-
nicaciones. La demanda es incierta en el momento
de invertir (roll-out). Las empresas dependen del cré-
dito tanto en el momento de invertir como en el mo-
mento de adquirir la licencia. Bajo simetría, y como
consecuencia de la responsabilidad limitada de las
empresas, la inversión de las empresas es decrecien-
te en el volumen de deuda heredado de la fase de
adquisición de licencia. Comparamos las subastas
con los "concursos de belleza". Las subastas extraen
un precio más alto por la licencia, y por lo tanto in-
ducen una inversión menor. Desde un punto de vista
de un planificador interesado en el excedente total,
los "concursos de belleza" dominan a las acciones
cuando el motivo de recaudación no es importante y
las actividades de influencia no son un despilfarro.
 Palabras clave
Subastas, licencias, concursos de belleza, responsa-
bilidad.
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1. Introduction
A few years ago, Europe went through an exciting sequences of experien-
ces in the allocation of licenses for UMTS or 3G telecom (see, for instance,
Börgers and Dustmann, 2003, Jehiel and Moldovany, 2003, Klemperer,
2002, or van Damme, 2002). Different countries used different procedures
and the results, particularly in terms of revenue, were extremely diverse.
Some countries used auctions (UK, Germany, Italy, etc.), and some others
used alternative, administrative procedures that are usually termed “beauty
contests” (France, Spain, etc.). Much discussion has ensued as to particular
aspects of design, especially auction design, in relation to issues like entry or
collusion. Less has been said about the relative virtues of auctions and beauty
contests. It seems that there is almost complete concensus in regarding
beauty contests as inferior in terms of both efficiency, i.e., putting the licen-
ses in the hands of the ablest, and revenue. This paper puts emphasis on a
different sort of efficiency: the future behavior of firms in the final market.
It is almost a cliché to consider that any payment resulting from allo-
cating the license will be considered as a sunk cost when firms choose their
actions in the market. However, this requires that the conditions under
which firms take decisions in the future are indeed unaffected by those pay-
ments. When all markets (capital and other) are perfect, this requirement
may be satisfied. In the case of industries using new telecommunication
technologies, we claim that this is not the case.
The sort of imperfection we consider in this paper is the uncertainty
about the profitability of the market (demand and network roll-out costs).
This occurred extensively when most of the licenses were allocated in Europe.
This uncertainty, when coupled with limited liability, establishes a link
between payments in exchange for licenses and future behavior in the mar-
ket. Indeed, when firms have to resort to credit markets, uncertainty means
that the interest rate is a function of both the size of new debt and the size
of inherited debt. This is because the recovery rate in case the market turns
out not to be viable is decreasing with total debt. Thus, at the time the
firms take decisions about investment in establishing the network, the cost
of capital will be larger the larger the debt inherited from acquiring the
license.
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In this paper we show that this results in a negative relationship
between investment in network roll-out and license price. Thus, an alloca-
tion method that results in a higher price for the license also results in a
lower investment in the market. We show that unless revenue motives are
important, auctions will induce a level of investment below the socially ef-
ficient. Beauty contests, on the other hand, result in a higher level of in-
vestment. Thus, when beauty contests do not result in wasteful spending
and revenue motives are not important, beauty contests may be superior
to auctions.
Certainly, there are many caveats to the conclusions just mentioned.
We conduct the analysis in an environment where firms are symmetric, so
that we abstract from one of the most praised properties of auctions: the
ability to identify the ablest firms. As the FCC\ put it in a filing to the US Su-
preme Court, “Under the auction mechanism, it is the winning bidder’s wi-
llingness and ability to pay the most for the license that identifies it as the
party that will best use the spectrum in the public interest” 1. Accepting this
statement, the ability to win a license is not so perfectly correlated to willing-
ness to pay in beauty contests as it is in auctions. Thus, the aim of this paper
is not to convince the reader that beauty contests are “always” superior to
auctions, but rather pointing to one reason why we should not discard them
as a reasonable alternative. Namely, a mechanism that extracts a high price
as a reflection of licensees’ willingness to pay may identify the ablest but it
may also undermine their ability in the process.
We claim that our results illustrate part of what has happened in the
development of 3G. For John Tennent, of Corporate Edge, the Telecom
meltdown that followed the major wave of license allocation in Europe, was
mainly caused by too high bid prices and the consequently high cost of debt
required to finance these bids. “This prevented the telecom companies bo-
rrowing for their infraestructure and thus led to cost cutting programmes,
the rest is history” 2.
There exists a literature on bidding under financial constraints, with
or without the possibility of credit (for instance, Che and Gale, 1998 and
1996, Benoit and Khrisna, 2001, or Hyde and Vercammen, 2002) and limited
liability (Zheng, 2001). The emphasis there is on how these (mainly exoge-
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1. FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., et al., Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari, No.
01-653 (S.Ct.), of 10/19/01; www.fcc.gov/ogc/briefs/nextwavepet.pdf.
2. Cited from Business Week Online, “Telecom Meltdown: Don’t Blame Us, Say Forecasters”,
October 13, 2003.
nous) constraints affect behavior in the bidding game and on which auction
designs are more appropriate. Here we point to the effects of bidding on fu-
ture behavior in the market. In that sense, our model has no reduced form
as either a private or a common value auction model. We model this invest-
ment and the final market competition similarly to Vives (1990). We add to
his model credit market imperfections due to uncertainty and limited liabi-
lity. The paper most closely related to this is Haan and Toolsema (2003).
They also assume that firms borrow to finance their bids in a uncertain
(cost) world with limited liability. The debt is assumed to affect firms’ profits
and behavior in the final market, because the decisions in that market (out-
put, in our case) are taken before uncertainty is resolved. On the other
hand, the market conditions are exogenous, since there is no investment
stage in Haan and Toolsema (2003). The effects of these differences turn
out to be dramatic. For instance, in their paper, prices are decreasing in the
amount of debt, exactly the opposite of what we obtain. This is coupled with
a higher probability of bankrupcy (which in their model is endogenous),
and then welfare implications are more difficult to obtain. We will comment
more on these differences later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a
simple model of oligopolistic competition preceeded by debt-financed licen-
se acquisition and investment under uncertainty. Section 3 solves the final
market competitioin for given levels of investment, and once the uncer-
tainty has been resolved. We analyze investment decisions in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 establishes the efficiency benchmark by looking at the planner’s solu-
tion. With all these elements, in Section 6 we compare the solutions under
beauty contest auction. A section is deboted to discussing the results and
some of the assumptions. Then some concluding remarks close the paper.
license allocation and performance in telecommunications markets
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2. Model
N firms are potential holders of 2 licenses. Licenses are necessary to opera-
te in a Cournot market characterized by the inverse demand function 
p = a – b (qi + qj)
Firms have quadratic (variable) costs of operating in the market 
wiCi (qi; wi) = — qi22
that depend on the level of their investment in a physical asset, Ii: wi = wi (Ii),
with w’i (Ii) < 0, and w”i (Ii) ≥ 0.
Once the two licenses are assigned (and after observing any price
paid for them), firms simultaneously choose the level of their investment. At
this point they do not know the value of the parameter a, which can take
two values: low and high. With probability 1 – α, the parameter a takes the
low value, which we assume as equal to 0. 3 We also assume that the liquida-
tion value of the physical assets is lIi, where l represents the salvage unit pri-
ce of the equipment, and this is insufficient to repay the debt. For instance,
this happens when, as we will assume, l < m, where m is the riskless price of
capital. With probability α, demand will be high, so that repayment of in-
vestment (and license price) is feasible. To that effect, we assume that the
high value of a (and also α) is high enough so that in the good realization if
demand the (equilibrium) debt can be repaid.
We assume that firms do not have capital. Thus, they have to borrow
from competitive banks both to make any payment associated to acquiring
the license and to acquire the physical assets. Then firms borrow at possibly
two points in time: at the time of acquiring the license and at the time of in-
vesting. As we have already mentioned, the unit cost of capital for banks is
m. Finally, we assume all agents to be risk neutral.
roberto burguet
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3. Consequently, we assume that the license is worthless in this case.
3. Final market 
competition
DEFINE D (wi, wj) = (b + wi) (b + wj) + b (2b + wi + wj). Given the investment
decisions by both firms, and in case the parameter a takes the high value,
firm i maximizes market profits 
πi
m = P (qi + qj) qi – Ci (qi; wi),
by setting
(b + wj)qi = a ———— (3.1)D (wi, wj)
and then the price is
(b + wj) (b + wi)pi = a ——————— D (wi, wj)
which implies market profits equal to 
wi
πi
m = (b + —) (qi)2 (3.2)2
Final market profits are increasing in the level of physical assets, Ii.
That is, they are decreasing in wi. Indeed
∂πim 1 wi ∂qi—— = — (qi)2 + 2(b + —) qi ——∂wi 2 2 ∂wi
and
∂qi (2b + wj)—— =  – qi ————∂wi D (wi, wj)
license allocation and performance in telecomunications markets
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so that 
∂πim 1 b2—— = – (qi)2 (— + ————) < 0∂wi 2 D (wi, wj)
On the other hand, final market profits are decreasing in the level of
physical assets of the rival firm, Ij (that is, increasing in wj):
∂πim ∂qi—— = (2b + wi) qi ——∂wj ∂wj
and
∂qi b—— = qj ————∂wj D (wi, wj)
so that
∂πim b (2b + wi)—— = qi qj ———— > 0∂wj D (wi, wj)
Also, notice that when wj = w = w, so that qi = qj = q,
∂πim ∂πim (b + w)2—— + —— = –q2 ———— < 0∂wj ∂wi 2D (w, w)
so that an increase in symmetric levels of investment increases the final mar-
ket profits of both firms.
Finally, investment in physical assets by the two firms are strategic
substitutes, at least for not too disimilar investment levels. Indeed, for qi = qj
∂2πim(i.e., for wi = wj), ——— < 0∂wi ∂wj
roberto burguet verde
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4. Investment in
physical assets
WHEN firms take investment decisions, they hold a debt (as a consequence
of license acquisition) of Bi. At this time, firms (and banks) know α, but not
the realization of the demand. That is, they are still uncertain about whether
the demand in the final market will be high or low. As we have already men-
tioned, we assume that l < m, so that the liquidation value of the physical assets
is not enough to repay the debt in the bad state of the world. For instance,
l(Ii) < mIi. Banks take that into account, so that if the firm borrows Ii the interest
r (Ii; Bi) that banks charge satisfies the zero profit condition for banks, i.e.,
lIim = αr (Ii; Bi) + (1 – α) ———,Ii + Bi
under the assumption that in case of failure, the liquidation value is shared
proportionally by all claimants. That is, the unit cost of funds for the firm is 
m 1 – α lIir (Ii; Bi) = — – ——— ——— . (4.1)α α Ii + Bi
Notice that this unit cost is increasing in Bi and decreasing in Ii. Then,
given the level of debt Bi, firm i solves 
MaxIi πi = α [πi
m – r (Ii; Bi) Ii – r (Bi) Bi],
where r (Bi) is the rate charged by banks on the debt Bi, constant at this sta-
ge. The first order condition of this problem is
1 b2 dwi[–(qi)2 (— + ————)] —— –2 D (wi, wj) dIi
m (1 – α) l Bi2[— – ———— (1 – ————)] = 0. (4.2)α α (Ii + Bi)2
license allocation and performance in telecomunications markets
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We notice that 
(1-α)l 2IiBi——— ————
dIi α (Ii + Bi)3—— = ———————— .∂2πidBi ——∂Ii2
The denominator of this expression is negative, at the optimal (interior)
choice of investment. The numerator is positive. Then, we conclude
dIiLemma 1: —— < 0
dBi
That is, the larger the payment firms make for their licenses, the lower
their investment. This lemma shows the basic conflict between the two goals
∂2πimof public revenue and incentives to invest. Remember that ———— < 0.∂wi ∂wjdIiThus, we conclude that —— > 0. In other words, the larger the debt held by
dBj
the rival firm, the larger the firm’s willingness to invest.
In the next section we will also need to know what happens with the
levels of investment when the levels of debt of both firms increase symmetri-
cally. Notice that the respective levels of investment will also change symme-
dIitrically. That is, dIi = dIj. Thus, we are interested in ——  | , where again, dBi Bi=Bj
from equation (4.2),
(1 – α)l 2Ii Bi——— ————
dIi α (Ii+Bi)3—— = ———————————
dB ∂2πi ∂2πim dwi dwj—— + ——— —— ——Bi=Bj=B ∂Ii2 ∂wi∂wj dIi dIj
The new term in the denominator is also negative. Thus, we conclude
that
dIiLemma 2: —— | < 0dBi Bi=Bj=B
roberto burguet verde
12
5. The planner’s 
solution
WE consider what would be an optimal market solution, from a planner’s
point of view, under the constraint that two firms at most operate in the
market, and the planner cannot control the behavior of the firms in the
market. Let λ represent the shadow price of public funds. This is the value
the planner places on an euro in revenues from assigning licenses. We will
consider only symmetric market structures 4.
From Lemma 2, the planner can control the firms’ choices of invest-
ment by simply controlling the level of debt (i.e. the relationship between B
and I is invertible). Thus, let B (I ) be the level of debt (per firm) that co-
rresponds to a level of investment (per firm) I. Given I, and therefore w,
output in the final market will be given by equation (3.1). Then, denoting
by Q (w) total output for (symmetric) w, the planner’s problem is
w Q(w)
MaxI α (∫0Q(w) (a – bx)dx – 2— [——]2) + (1 – α)l (2I) – m(2I) + 2λB(I)2 2
the solution to which satisfies
1 b dw m – (1 – α)l λB’ (I )
–qi2 [— + ———] —— – ————— + ——— = 0. (5.1)2 w + 3b dI α α
Let us compare equation (5.1) with (4.2). If B = 0, and in a symmetric
equilibrium, (4.2) becomes
license allocation and performance in telecomunications markets
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4. Recall that the final market is characterized by decreasing returns to scale, that w” (I ) > 0, and
that competition is more intense when firms are symmetric. Thus our restriction is without loss
of generality if for a fixed amout B of total debt, the maximum total investment I is attained when
the firms share the burden of B symmetrically.
1 b b dw m – (1 – α)l
–qi2 [— + ——— ———] —— – ————— = 0. (5.2)2 w + 3b b + w dI α
Evaluated at the solution to (5.1), the left hand side of (5.2) is equal to 
b w dw λB’ (I )
qi2 ——— (———) —— – ———w + 3b b + w dI α
The second order conditions for maximization of profits requires that
the left hand side of (5.2) is decreasing in Ii. Under global convexity, we can
then obtain some conclusions:
Remark 1: If the planner does not care about revenue (λ = 0), the le-
vel of investment in the private solution is lower than the level of investment
in the second best solution even when B = 0. In this case, simply giving away
the licenses is the best policy for the planner. When revenue is an important
enough goal (λ large), then the optimal price of the license is B > 0.
roberto burguet verde
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6. Auctions and
beauty contests
CONSIDER first one of the most common auction formats: sealed, pay-your
bid auction. The two highest bidders each win a license, and the winners
pay their own bids. Firms face a schedule rA(B), where the subscript A stands
for auction, and decide how much to bid B. Since licenses are a necessary
condition to obtain a positive profit, firms are willing to bid up to the point
where their profits are zero 5. In pure strategies, we conjecture that symme-
tric firms will bid up to that point. That is, we conjecture a sort of Bertrand
equilibrium in symmetric price competition with complete information.
Then, given r(B), a necessary condition for pure strategies, symmetric equi-
librium of this form is
πi
m(w, w) – r(I; B*)I – rA(B*)B* = 0 (6.1)
where r(I; B) is given by (4.1), I is given by (4.2), and w is the cost levels co-
rresponding to these (symmetric) investment levels. What equation (6.1)
defines is the bid at which, conditional on winning a license, the firm breaks
even in case the realization of demand is favorable (in any other case the
profit for the firm is zero anyway). A second necessary condition is that the
left hand side of (6.1) is negative for Bi > B*. Otherwise a firm could borrow
more and bid accordingly. This deviation would guarantee a license and po-
sitive profits when the state of the world is favorable. However, this second
condition is guaranteed,
Lemma 3: Given conjectured bid B by all other firms, the left hand side of
(6.1) is decreasing in Bi.
license allocation and performance in telecomunications markets
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5. Beyond this point, banks would not be willing to lend.
Proof: The derivative of this term, using the envelope theorem, redu-
ces to 
∂πim dIj ∂r(I; Bi)———w’j ——— – —————I – [r’A(Bi)Bi + rA(Bi)] (6.2).∂wj dBi ∂Bi
Now, for (competitive) equilibrium in the credit market, rA(B) satisfies
m 1 – α lIirA(Bi) = — – ——— ——— .α α Ii + Bi
Here Ii is the level of investment that the bank can expect from the
firm after bidding Bi for the license and obtaining one. The bank conjectu-
res that the bid of the rival firms is B, so that for any bid below B it expects
its own customer firm not to win a license. For any Bi > B the slope of rA(B)
is:
1 – α l dIirA’ (B) = – ——— ———— [–Ii + B ——]α (Ii + B)2 dB
dIiThe value of ——, from Lemma 1, is negative. Therefore, we conclude 
dB ∂r(I; Bi)that r’A(B) > 0. Thus, the three terms in (6.2) are negative, since ——— < 0,
∂πim dIj ∂Bi—— > 0, wj’ < 0, and —— > 0. QED∂wj dBi
Thus, equation (6.1) is necessary and sufficient for a symmetric equili-
brium in the auction of licenses. Moreover, conditions that guarantee that
this equation has only one solution are not hard to find.
1
A.1. w (I) is log convex, and b < ——.
2 2
Lemma 4: Under A.1, the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies when li-
censes are auctioned is unique.
Proof: Notice that equation (6.1) is necessary for a pure strategy, sym-
metric equilibrium. Indeed, if the left hand side was positive, a firm can in-
crease its profits by increasing its bid an arbitrarily small amount. If it was
negative, the bank would not be willing to lend that much.
Now, computing the derivative of the right hand side of (6.1) with res-
pect to the symmetric level of B, and applying the envelope theorem from
the optimal choice of I, we obtain
roberto burguet verde
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∂πim dIi ∂r(I; B)I ∂rA(B)B———wj’ ——| – ———— – ———— .∂wj dBi Bi=Bj ∂B ∂B
Applying the envelope theorem again, we can write this as
∂πim / ∂wj dIi ∂r(I; B)I ∂r(I; B)I ∂rA(B)B————— —— | ———— – ———— – ————∂πjm / ∂wj dBi Bi=Bj ∂I ∂B ∂B
∂πim / ∂wj dIiNow, |————| < 1. Also, |—| | < 1, under assumption A.1. Indeed,∂πjm / ∂wj dBi Bi=Bj
∂2πi ∂2πim ∂2πim ∂πim ∂2πim—— + ———wi’ wj’ = ——— (wi’)2 + ——wi” + ———wi’ wj’∂Ii2 ∂wi ∂wj ∂wi2 ∂wi ∂wi ∂wj
(1 – α) l 2IiBi– ———— ————
α (Ii + Bi)3
1 ∂2πim ∂πim 1 ∂2πimWhen b < ——, —— + —— — + ——— is negative. Together with log 
2 2 ∂wi2 ∂wi w ∂wi ∂wj
convexity of w, this implies that 
∂2πim ∂πim ∂2πim——— (wi’)2 + ———wi” + ————wi’ wj’ < 0∂wi2 ∂wi ∂wi ∂wj
∂IiThus, the denomiator in the expression of ——| is larger than dBi Bi=Bj
the numerator, in absolute value. Then, the derivative of the right hand side
of (6.1) with respect to B is smaller than
∂r(I; B)I ∂r(I; B)I ∂rA(B)B———— – ———— – ————∂I ∂B ∂B
m 1 – α 2I
= — – ——l [——] – rA(B) – rA’(B)Bα α I + B
1 – α I
= – ——l [——] – rA’(B)B < 0.α I + B
Thus, the right hand side (6.1) is decreasing. QED
Notice that A.1 is far from being necessary for uniqueness of symmetric
license allocation and performance in telecommunications markets
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equilibrium in the auction. Nevertheless, we choose to make this assumption
in order to simplify the analysis.
We now turn to an alternative to auctioning: beauty contests. Many ac-
tual mechanisms fall into this category (see Dykstra and van der Windt, 2004).
We choose to model a beauty contest as a lottery where the odds of different
parties are proportional to the efforts (expenditure) of these parties in what
we term influence activity 6. This may be an unfair characterization, yet it is
one that embodies the worst attributes that economists often critizise in
them. We also claim that it portrays the main characteristic of a process that
usually takes some time to conclude, during which firms are spending resour-
ces (assesment, development, etc.) with an uncertain outcome.
Thus, let Si be the expenditure of firm i in these activities. Firm i wins a 
2Silicense with probability ———. Investment decisions are still given by ∑j Sj
equation (4.2), with only substituting Si for Bi. In this case, however, zero
profits is not an equilibrium condition. In fact, firms choose their expendi-
ture in influence activity so as to maximize
2Siα ——— [πim (w, w) – r(I; Si)I – rBC(Si)Si],∑j Sj
where, since now the break-even condition for a bank is
2Si lIim = ——— [αrBC(Si) + (1 – α) ———]∑j Sj Ii + Si
satisfies that
∑j Sj m 1 – α lIirBC(Si) = ——— — – ——— ———2Si α α Ii + Si
Notice the difference between rBC(S) and rA(B). For the same (and
symmetric) level of expenditure associated to acquiring the license (S = B),
rBC(S) > rA(B). Also, r’BC(S) < r’A.
In a symmetric equilibrium, firms maximize profits when all parties,
banks and firms, conjecture the right expenditures in influence activities.
roberto burguet verde
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6. This is another difference with Haan and Toolsema (2003). They model beauty contests as
fixing the price of licenses at zero. They also consider posted prices.
The first difference between beauty contests and auctions appears in the
profits of the firms.
Proposition 1: In a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium, firms’ profits are positive
when licenses are assigned through a beauty contest and zero when they are assigned
through an auction.
Proof: The first order conditions for maximization of profits in a be-
auty contest, under equilibrium conjectures is
∂πim dIj ∂r(I; S) 2(———wj —— – ————I – [r’BC(S)S + rBC(S)]) — +∂wj dBi ∂Bi N
2(N –1)
[πim – r(I; S)I – rBC(S)S] ———— = 0.N2 S
Similarly to the case of auctions (equation (6.2)), the first term in the
left hand side above is negative. Indeed, although we cannot gurantee that
r’BC ≥ 0, one can check that, if r(I; S) > 0 (a condition for interior solution), 
∂r(I; S) ∂πim dIjthen ———I + [r’BC(S)S + rBC(S)] > 0. On the other hand, ——w’j —— < 0∂Bi ∂wj dBi
just as in the case of auction. But if the first term is negative, we have to con-
clude that 
πi
m – r(I; S)I – rBC(S)S > 0,
as we wanted to show. QED
This is in contrast with the results in Haan and Toolsema (2003). The-
re firms obtain positive profits when licenses are assigned through auctions.
The reason is credit rationing. In their model, uncertainty is not resolved
before market competition. Thus, increasing the nominal interest rate
(debt burden) induces firms to take a more aggresive stance in the market
and then lowers the gross profits of firms. If uncertainty was resolved before
firms had to decide on market variables, then the debt burden would be a
sunk cost at this point. Thus an equilibrium with positive profits and proba-
bility of winning the auction less than one for a firm could not exist, even if
bankrupcy was endogenous, as in their model.
We are also interested in how the two licencing mechanisms compare
as to firms’ incentives to invest. Given Lemma 2, this amounts to comparing
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firms’ equilibrium levels of debt. That is , to compare B with S in equilibrium.
As one could expect, B > S.
Proposition 2: The level of investment by firms is lower when the licenses are assig-
ned through auction than when they are assigned through a beauty contest.
Proof: Notice that for B = S, in a symmetric equilibrium, firms’ profits
in a beauty contest are negative whenever they are negative in an auction.
Indeed, firms’ profits in a beauty contest are
2Si——— [πim(w, w) – r(I; Si)I – rBC(Si)Si]∑j Sj
2 2
= — [πim(w, w) – r(I; S)I – rA(S)S] – — [rBC(S)S –rA(S)]SN N
Now, rBC(S) – rA(S) >0, and the first term in the right hand side is 
( 2—N times) the profit of a firm in an auction when all firms hold a debt of S.
Thus, if this profit is negative, then the left hand side, the profit of a firm in
a beauty contest when all firms spend S in influence activities, is negative
too. Now, if B is the equilibrium bid (level of debt) in the auction, then the
profit of firms when they hold any level of debt higher than that is negative.
Since, from Proposition 1 the equilibrium profit in a beauty contest is positi-
ve, we conclude that S is indeed lower than B. Then, from Lemma 2, Propo-
sition 2 follows. QED
roberto burguet verde
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7. Discussion
A direct corollary of Proposition 2 is that market outcomes, that is, all that
happens after licenses are assigned, are more efficient following beauty con-
tests than following auctions. Certainly, this result is subject to several caveats.
One of the important assumptions for the conclusion is that firms are sym-
metric. That is, the assignment mechanism does not play any role in selec-
ting the most effective firms as users of the licenses (providers of the servi-
ce). This is probably unrealistic. When firms are heterogeneous, the results
above should be understood as a drawback of assignment mechanisms that
use (license) price competition as a device to elicit information about the
effectiveness of firms. Beauty contests (of the type analyzed above) will al-
ways result in a positive probability that a less effective firm happens to be
selected as a license holder. Auctions, on the other hand, are better at put-
ting licenses in the right hands. However, competitive bidding attains that
goal by relying on the fact that firms that are more able to generate 
(and extract) surplus in the final market are more willing to pay, and will
pay more, for a license. The point made in the previous section is that higher
prices for licenses may undermine the ability of (all) firms to generate that
surplus.
A second caveat has to do with revenue and waste. Indeed, in addition
to outcomes in the final market, auctions and beauty contests may differ
dramatically in what occurs at the moment of allocating licenses. In this res-
pect, comparing auctions and beauty contests requires understanding what
is the nature of influence activities and the expenditures that we denoted by
S. Indeed, when licenses are auctioned, firms’ payments are transfers to the
seller (government). However, in the sort of beauty contests that we are con-
sidering, these payments may be of a different nature. In one extreme, one
can think of the government organizing lotteries, so that influence activity
simply means buying more tickets of that lottery 7. In the other extreme,
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7. Dykstra and van der Windt (2004) distinguish between lotteries and beauty contests. Beauty
contests would rather range from posted prices mechanisms to multidimensional auctions.
firms’ payments would be pure waste, unproductive expenses aimed only at
convincing the official to award the license to the firm. In general, we would
expect that a fraction of the influence activity expenditure translates into
government revenues (or is spent in ways that the goverment values). Thus,
a payment S of a firm would translate into a revenue δS for the government
and waste (1 – δ)S. Those revenues for the government are valued at λ.
Thus, when revenue motives are not important, λ = 0, comparing auctions
with beauty contests from the point of view of the government means com-
paring a social waste of N (1 – δ) S with the market efficiency gains of hig-
her investment. When λ > 0, we should also consider total revenue. One
first question is whether NS is larger or lower than 2B. Che and Gale (1996)
have shown that all-pay auctions with financially constrained bidders result
in higher revenues for the seller than first price auctions. The possibility of
hitting the constraint is lower in the former, and then this breaks revenue
equivalence in its favor. We should expect something similar in our model.
On the one hand, the fact that the cost of credit is increasing in the volume
is a (endogenous) generalization of financial constraints. On the other
hand, all-pay auctions share with the beauty contest analyzed here the fact that
non-winners do have to pay their bids. It is easy to check that in equilibrium 
2
— rBC < rA. That is, for the same total expenditure in license acquisition N
(2B = NS), we would have S rBC <B rA. The interest rate is the measure of fi-
nancial constraints in our model. Then we conclude that firms are more “fi-
nancially constrained” in a pay your bid auction than in a beauty contest,
just as they are more so in a first-price auction than in an all-pay auction, in
the model by Che and Gale. Additionally, in our model firms invest more
under beauty contests, and as we mentioned above higher investment (as a
proportion of total credit) lowers the interest rate.
Does this result in higher revenues for the seller? The answer is not
clear. Indeed, part of the surplus created by lower credit constraints and
then higher investment is appropriated by the firms (they obtain positive
profits). Therefore, we cannot generally conclude that firms’ total spending
is higher under beauty contest.
There is one simplifying assumption in our model that we should
Comment on. We have asumed that the probability of default (1 – α) is
exogenous. In particular, it is independent of license payments. When 
licenses fetch prices as high as in th UK or Germany, this may not be 
the case.
Considering the posibilty of endogenous default means introducing a
higher slope of the interest rate with respect to the volume of credit. Thus,
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this only contributes to making mechanisms that fetch high prices, like auc-
tions, less attractive from a social point of view, by reinforcing precisely the
points we have made in this paper.
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8. Concluding
remarks
WE have analyzed a simple model of an oligopolistic market with invest-
ment and uncertain demand. We have claimed that this is a model that fits
telecommunication markets using new technologies, and have analyzed how
the licensing mechanisms affect the outcome in these markets. In particular,
we have emphasized the relationship between license prices and the price
of credit. Due to this relationship, higher license prices result in lower in-
vestment and less market efficiency in the final market.
There are interesting issues that fall beyond the scope of this paper.
One of these questions has to do with designing licensing mechanisms free
from excessive pricing that still guarantee that licenses end up in the right
hands, when firms are asymmetric. When firms have private information
about their asymmetric characteristics, this latter goal is not trivial. Resale is
not an answer, because of asymmetric information. Yet, using willingness to
bid as a signal of potential performance may, as we have been arguing in
this paper, affect incentives to invest. We hope that the present paper indu-
ces this and similar lines of research.
roberto burguet
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